EU-NATO joint declaration

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

We believe that the time has come to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

In consultation with the EU Member States and the NATO Allies, working with, and for the benefit of all, this partnership will take place in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members.

Today, the Euro-Atlantic community is facing unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and East. Our citizens demand that we use all ways and means available to address these challenges so as to enhance their security.

All Allies and Member States, as well as the EU and NATO per se, are already making significant contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. The substantial cooperation between NATO and the EU, unique and essential partners, established more than 15 years ago, also contributes to this end. In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step-up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond.

We are convinced that enhancing our neighbours' and partners' stability in accordance with our values, as enshrined in the UN Charter, contributes to our security and to sustainable peace and prosperity. So that our neighbours and partners are better able to address the numerous challenges they currently face, we will continue to support their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, as well as their reform efforts.

In fulfilling the objectives above, we believe there is an urgent need to:

• Boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response. The development of coordinated procedures through our respective playbooks will substantially contribute to implementing our efforts.

• Broaden and adapt our operational cooperation including at sea, and on migration, through increased sharing of maritime situational awareness as well as better coordination and mutual reinforcement of our activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

• Expand our coordination on cyber security and defence including in the context of our missions and operations, exercises and on education and training.

• Develop coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects.

• Facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic.

• Step up our coordination on exercises, including on hybrid, by developing as the first step parallel and coordinated exercises for 2017 and 2018.

• Build the defence and security capacity and foster the resilience of our partners in the East and South in a complementary way through specific projects in a variety of areas for individual recipient countries, including by strengthening maritime capacity.

Cooperation in these areas is a strategic priority. Speedy implementation is essential. The European External Action Service and the NATO International Staff, together with Commission services as appropriate, will develop concrete options for implementation, including appropriate staff coordination mechanisms, to be presented to us and our respective Councils by December 2016. On the EU side, the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission will steer and coordinate this endeavour.

We will review progress on a regular basis.

We call on both organisations to invest the necessary political capital and resources to make this reinforced partnership a success.

Signed at Warsaw on 8 July 2016 in triplicate.

Donald Tusk President of the European Council
Jean-Claude Juncker President of the European Commission
Jens Stoltenberg Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Read more...

CETA: the EU-Canada free trade agreement (Commons Briefing papers CBP-7492)

CETA: the EU-Canada free trade agreement

Published Wednesday, November 9, 2016

This note provides details about CETA, the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Partnership. This is a free trade agreement between the EU and Canada.

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is a free trade agreement between the EU and Canada. CETA is probably less well known than TTIP – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – a controversial trade deal currently being negotiated between the EU and the US. CETA is, however, potentially closer to implementation. The CETA talks were completed in 2014 and the agreement was signed on 30 October 2016. Signing of the agreement was delayed by a few days due to objections from the Walloon Parliament. Signature of the agreement does not mean it comes into force immediately. The next step is consideration of the agreement by the European Parliament. Provided the European Parliament gives its consent, much (but not all) of CETA may come into force provisionally. CETA could come into force provisionally in Spring 2017.

CETA removes all tariffs on industrial products traded between the EU and Canada. Most will be removed when the agreement comes into force. All will be removed within seven years. There is substantial liberalisation of trade in agricultural products. EU businesses will be allowed to bid for public procurement contracts in Canada.

The European Commission has put CETA forward as a “mixed agreement” while maintaining its strict legal view that CETA is an “EU-only” agreement. As a mixed agreement, CETA must be ratified by each EU Member State and must receive the European Parliament’s consent. In the UK, the agreement must be laid before Parliament for a period of 21 sitting days. The agreement can only be ratified if the 21 day period has passed without either House having resolved that it should not be ratified. In the event of such a resolution by the Commons, a further period of 21 days is triggered during which the Commons can again raise objections. The European Scrutiny Committee has recommended that there be a debate on CETA on the Floor of the House of Commons.

The agreement may be provisionally implemented after consent from the European Parliament but before ratification by Member States. The Commission favours this approach. Only those areas of the agreement falling within EU competence may be provisionally applied. Critics argue that this could cover most of CETA. The Commission has said that the controversial Investment Court System provisions will not be provisionally applied. They will not, therefore, come into force unless the CETA is ratified by Member States.

Those in favour of CETA argue that it will boost trade between the EU and Canada. CETA has been described by the European Commission as “a milestone in European trade policy” and “the most ambitious trade agreement that the EU has ever concluded.” The European Commission argues that criticisms of the investment provisions are unfounded, claiming that CETA protects governments’ right to regulate and that the proposed Investment Court System is a fairer and more transparent replacement for the widely criticised Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions.

Critics argue that the agreement is unduly favourable to business and may lead to a lowering of regulatory standards. Opponents of CETA remain unconvinced by the reforms to the investment provisions, arguing that these give foreign investors special privileges and may deter governments from legislating in the public interest for fear of litigation. CETA is also seen by some as a way of bringing in elements of TTIP through the back door. There have also been criticisms of the process of ratifying trade deals – in particular that CETA may be subject to “provisional application” – ie before parliaments in EU Member States have had a chance to ratify it.

While the UK remains in the EU, it will be subject to CETA’s provisions once it comes into force. The precise date of Brexit is not yet known but given the time needed to ratify CETA in all EU Member States (assuming it is ratified), there is a possibility that the UK will have left the EU by the time CETA comes fully into force. While the situation is not entirely clear, the general view is that the UK would need to renegotiate its trade agreements with non-EU countries after Brexit. It has been suggested that if Brexit occurred after full ratification of CETA, the UK could be bound by its investment provisions for 20 years.

 

Read more...

CETA: the EU-Canada free trade agreement (House of Commons Library, BRIEFING PAPER Number 7492, 9 November 2016)

House of Commons Library

BRIEFING PAPER Number 7492, 9 November 2016

CETA: the EU-Canada free trade agreement

By Dominic Webb

Contents

Summary    
1.    Background    
2.    Details of the agreement
3.    Controversial aspects
3.1    Investor protection
3.2    Trade in services
4.    Ratification of CETA in European and UK Parliament
4.1    CETA as a “mixed” agreement
4.2    Ratification in the EU    
4.3    Provisional application
4.4    Ratification by UK Parliament
5.    Impact of Brexit
6.    Links to further information

Summary

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is a free trade agreement between the EU and Canada. CETA is probably less well known than TTIP – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – a controversial trade deal currently being negotiated between the EU and the US. CETA is, however, potentially closer to implementation. The CETA talks were completed in 2014 and the agreement was signed on 30 October 2016. Signing of the agreement was delayed by a few days due to objections from the Walloon Parliament. Signature of the agreement does not mean it comes into force immediately. The next step is consideration of the agreement by the European Parliament. Provided the European Parliament gives its consent, much (but not all) of CETA may come into force provisionally.  CETA could come into force provisionally in Spring 2017.

CETA removes all tariffs on industrial products traded between the EU and Canada. Most will be removed when the agreement comes into force. All will be removed within seven years. There is substantial liberalisation of trade in agricultural products. EU businesses will be allowed to bid for public procurement contracts in Canada.

The European Commission has put CETA forward as a “mixed agreement” while maintaining its strict legal view that CETA is an “EU-only” agreement. As a mixed agreement, CETA must be ratified by each EU Member State and must receive the European Parliament’s consent. In the UK, the agreement must be laid before Parliament for a period of 21 sitting days. The agreement can only be ratified if the 21 day period has passed without either House having resolved that it should not be ratified. In the event of such a resolution by the Commons, a further period of 21 days is triggered during which the Commons can again raise objections. The European Scrutiny Committee has recommended that there be a debate on CETA on the Floor of the House of Commons.

The agreement may be provisionally implemented after consent from the European Parliament but before ratification by Member States. The Commission favours this approach. Only those areas of the agreement falling within EU competence may be provisionally applied. Critics argue that this could cover most of CETA. The Commission has said that the controversial Investment Court System provisions will not be provisionally applied. They will not, therefore, come into force unless the CETA is ratified by Member States.

Those in favour of CETA argue that it will boost trade between the EU and Canada. CETA has been described by the European Commission as “a milestone in European trade policy” and “the most ambitious trade agreement that the EU has ever concluded.” The European Commission argues that criticisms of the investment provisions are unfounded, claiming that CETA protects governments’ right to regulate and that the proposed Investment Court System is a fairer and more transparent replacement for the widely criticised Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions.

Critics argue that the agreement is unduly favourable to business and may lead to a lowering of regulatory standards. Opponents of CETA remain unconvinced by the reforms to the investment provisions, arguing that these give foreign investors special privileges and may deter governments from legislating in the public interest for fear of litigation.

CETA is also seen by some as a way of bringing in elements of TTIP through the back door. There have also been criticisms of the process of ratifying trade deals – in particular that CETA may be subject to “provisional application” – ie before parliaments in EU Member States have had a chance to ratify it.

While the UK remains in the EU, it will be subject to CETA’s provisions once it comes into force. The precise date of Brexit is not yet known but given the time needed to ratify   CETA in all EU Member States (assuming it is ratified), there is a possibility that the UK will have left the EU by the time CETA comes fully into force. While the situation is not entirely clear, the general view is that the UK would need to renegotiate its trade agreements with non-EU countries after Brexit. It has been suggested that if Brexit occurred after full ratification of CETA, the UK could be bound by its investment provisions for 20 years.

 

1.                 Background

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is a trade deal between the EU and Canada. The European Commission has described CETA as “a milestone in European trade policy” and “the most ambitious trade agreement that the EU has ever concluded.”1

UK exports to Canada were worth £7.3 billion in 2015 while imports amounted to £7.4 billion. Canada accounted for 1.4% of UK exports of goods and services and also 1.4% of imports. Services accounted for around 45% of UK exports to Canada while UK imports were predominantly goods. The UK had an overall trade deficit with Canada of £0.1 billion in 2015. A surplus of £1.9 billion on trade in services was offset by a deficit of £2.0 billion on trade in goods.

Negotiations for this treaty began in May 2009 and were completed in August 2014. In July 2016, the European Commission proposed that the agreement be concluded and signed.2  CETA was signed on 30    October 2016. Its signature was delayed by a few days by objections from the Walloon Parliament. The EU and Canada have also signed a “Joint Interpretative Instrument” on CETA. This document, which will have legal force, clarifies what has been agreed by Canada and the EU in a number of controversial areas such as the Investment Court System, governments’ right to regulate, and labour and environmental standards.3 Signature of the agreement does not mean that CETA comes into force immediately.4

It has been reported that the European Commission and Canada want the agreement to come into force in 2017 (see section 4 on ratification process and “provisional application”).5

The agreement will remove the vast majority of customs duties as well as removing other barriers to trade. It aims to boost trade, strengthen economic relations and create jobs. The UK Government considers that as a result of CETA, UK exports to Canada will increase by 29% and Canadian exports to the UK will increase by 15%, and in the long run, the benefit to the UK economy will be of the order of £1.3 billion per annum. 6 The European Commission claim that it will lead to a yearly

€12 billion increase in EU GDP. 7 These estimates have been disputed. 8

 

 

In a speech at the European Parliament in December 2015, Cecilia Malmström, the EU Trade Commissioner, set out some of the advantages of CETA as follows:

  • CETA is an agreement with a major economic In economic terms Canada is as big as Russia. It's bigger than Spain. It's bigger than Sweden, Belgium, Austria and the Czech Republic combined. It's therefore a vital part of the platform of agreements we are building to make sure the EU is properly connected to the global economy.
  • It's also a highly ambitious In many areas it does more to remove barriers to economic opportunity for European workers, consumers and entrepreneurs than any other EU free trade agreement so far. Not only on tariff removal but also on public procurement, services or geographical indications.
  • And CETA is a significant step forward in our efforts to shape the future of the global economy, inspired by European values. It's therefore consistent with the approach we have adopted in our new strategy in

[…]

  • Overall we estimate tariff savings for EU exporters of around 470 million euro a year for industrial And that's particularly important since our competitors in the US don't have to pay those duties, as they already have an agreement with Canada. So CETA is about levelling the playing field for the EU. 9

CETA has generally received much less interest than the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – a free trade agreement currently being negotiated between the EU and US. 10 However, critics  of these trade agreements have pointed to parallels between them and argue that CETA could set a dangerous precedent for TTIP.11 The Financial Times reported in May 2016 that public support for CETA (and TTIP) was “flagging” both in the EU and the US and that opponents of CETA in Germany were planning legal action against the agreement.12

 

 

2.                 Details of the agreement

CETA removes customs duties on trade in industrial products between the EU and Canada. Most will be removed as soon as the agreement comes into force. Others will be removed gradually (within 3, 5 or 7 years). There is substantial elimination of customs duties on agricultural products. There are some exceptions: trade in poultry and eggs is not being liberalised on either side and restrictions remain on trade in some other agricultural products.13

EU companies will be permitted to bid for public procurement contracts in Canada, including those let by provincial governments. According to the European Commission “European businesses will be the first foreign companies to get that level of access to Canadian public procurement markets.”14

CETA provides for a Regulatory Co-operation Forum which will allow the exchange of relevant information between EU and Canadian regulators and help identify areas where they could co-operate.

CETA contains provisions relating to investment. These are one of the most controversial aspects of the agreement (see section 3.1 below). According to the European  Commission website:

CETA removes and alleviates barriers for investors to enter the Canadian market. Moreover, the agreement ensures that all European investors in Canada are treated equally and fairly. To improve the investment climate and offer more certainty to all investors, the EU and Canada have committed to key principles, such as non-discrimination between domestic and foreign investors. Canada and EU also commit that they will not impose any new restrictions on foreign shareholding. 15

Another area covered by the agreement is trade in services. The European Commission estimates that approximately 50% of the gains on the EU side from CETA come from the removal of barriers to trade in services. According to the Commission, the agreement improves access to a number of service sector markets in Canada including financial services, telecoms, energy and maritime transport. The agreement also covers future work between Canada and the EU on mutual recognition of qualifications in regulated professions. The liberalisation of services is another of the most controversial areas of the agreement and is discussed more in section 3.2 below.

According to the Commission, CETA will protect “geographical indications” ie European foods which are associated with a specific area or region. The Commission website says:

CETA recognises the special status and offers protection on the Canadian market to numerous European agricultural products from a specific geographical origin. The use of geographical

 

 

indications (GIs) such as Grana Padano, Roquefort, Elia Kalamatas Olives or Aceto balsamico di Modena will be reserved in Canada to products imported from European regions where they traditionally come from. 16

Annex 20-A of CETA contains a list of these products. There are no UK products on the list.17

Full details of the measures contained in CETA can be found on the European Commission’s website.

 

3.                 Controversial aspects

3.1               Investor protection

CETA contains controversial measures relating to investment. These were originally known as ISDS (Investor State Dispute Settlement) provisions. In response to concerns about ISDS, the European Commission and the Canadian Government announced, in February 2016, that they had agreed a new approach to investment protection and dispute settlement in CETA. This new approach, known as ICS (Investment Court System) is based on the EU’s proposals in this area, made in the TTIP negotiations in November 2015.

The Commission has stressed its view that these arrangements guarantee governments’ right to regulate in the public interest. The Commission has said that the new system ensures “a high level of protection for investors while fully preserving the right of governments to regulate and pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as the protection of health, safety or the environment.”18 The reforms also introduce an independent investment court system and include measures to introduce more transparency into dispute proceedings, and prevent conflicts of interest on the part of Tribunal members.

In a joint statement, Cecilia Malmström and Chrystia Freeland (Canadian Minister of International Trade) said:

As part of the legal review, modifications were made to the Investment Chapter, further to discussions between EU and Canadian officials. With these modifications, Canada and the EU will strengthen the provisions on governments’ right to regulate; move to a permanent, transparent, and institutionalised dispute settlement tribunal; revise the process for the selection of tribunal members, who will adjudicate investor claims; set out more detailed commitments on ethics for all tribunal members; and agree to an appeal system.

We have responded to Canadians, EU citizens, and businesses with a fairer, more transparent, system.

These modifications reflect our desire to reform investment protection and dispute resolution provisions and to continue working together to improve the process, including working with other trading partners to pursue the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal, a project to which the EU and Canada are firmly committed. 19

Critics of the investment provisions say that they are still unduly favourable to multinational companies and argue that the change from ISDS to ICS does little to address the problem of foreign companies having recourse to special tribunals, outside the domestic legal system. For example, Natacha Cingotti, trade campaigner for Friends of the Earth Europe, said:

Today’s proposals for CETA offer no significant improvement to the dangerous agreement and should fool no-one. The Investment Court System is nothing but private arbitration under another name, keeping VIP rights for foreign investors fully alive and allowing them to sideline the legal system in Europe."

We urge governments to listen to the millions of people across Europe who are calling for a full rejection of TTIP and CETA. In its current form, CETA should not be signed. 20

The main concern raised is that the investment provisions would allow foreign companies to sue governments in special tribunals outside the domestic legal system, if they have been adversely affected by changes in public policy. Critics argue that this constrains government action in the public interest in areas such as public health or environmental  policy. There are also concerns that as only investors can bring claims, the system is biased in their favour: it is argued that those involved have an incentive to find in favour of the investor as this generates more work for the judges and lawyers involved.

Similar provisions in TTIP are highly controversial and opponents of these trade deals see CETA as setting a dangerous precedent for TTIP. They also argue that CETA is a “Trojan horse” whereby US companies could make claims against EU policies using Canadian subsidiaries.21

A paper by Corporate Europe Observatory (and others) summed up the objections to ICS as follows:

it would empower thousands of companies to circumvent national legal systems and sue governments in parallel tribunals if laws and regulations undercut their ability to make money. It would pave the way for billions in taxpayer money being paid out to big business. It could curtail desirable policymaking to protect people and the planet. And it threatens to lock EU member states forever into the injustices of the ISDS regime.22

Over 100 legal academics published a statement setting out their objections to the investment provisions of CETA and TTIP.23

Concerns have been raised that the UK could be tied into CETA’s investment provisions for up to 20 years:

Campaign group Global Justice Now have also released an expert opinion on CETA and Brexit which argues that if the UK doesn’t formally leave the EU before CETA is ratified, then it would be tied into the trade deal for a period of twenty years after announcing any intention to leave the deal.24

Article 30.9 paragraph 2 allows for the investment provisions to be effective for 20 years after the termination of the agreement:

Notwithstanding paragraph 1, in the event that this Agreement is terminated, the provisions of Chapter Eight (Investment) shall continue to be effective for a period of 20 years after the date of termination of this Agreement in respect of investments made before that date. This paragraph shall not apply in the case of provisional application of this Agreement.25

 

3.2               Trade in services

CETA is the first trade agreement where the EU has agreed to open up its services markets using the “negative list” approach. This means that all service markets are liberalised except those explicitly excluded. Some service sectors were excluded from the outset by the EU in the negotiating mandate given to the Commission.26 These included

“audio-visual and other cultural services” as well as “services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”.27 According to a note prepared for the European Parliament, public services excluded from CETA  include health, education and other social services.28

A briefing by the trade union Unison explains its concerns in this area as follows:

Whilst the EU has opened up services in other trade agreements in the past, it always explicitly excluded public services from the beginning by using what is known as the ‘positive list’. However, negotiators have decided to use the so-called ‘negative list’ approach for TTIP, CETA and TiSA. This means that all services are open to market liberalisation unless a specific reservation is entered which has to be done on a service-by-service basis, and in some cases, on a country-by-country basis. Experience from other trade agreements shows that the negative list approach leads to the creeping liberalisation of public services as negotiators have failed to include sufficiently watertight exclusions.

Using a negative list also means a ‘ratchet-clause’ can be included in relation to market liberalisation. This means that even if a reservation is included in a treaty for a particular service, if a country then decides to liberalise the market for this service they are then obliged to maintain that level of market liberalisation and cannot reverse it. A ‘ratchet-clause’ locks in liberalisation and privatisation and would prevent bringing services back in-house.

The EU-Canada agreement (CETA) is now public and we know the European Union has negotiated exclusions for public services, including health, education and social services, from market liberalisation. However, CETA does include a ratchet clause and importantly there is no exclusion for public services from the controversial investment chapter. 29

There are criticisms of CETA in other areas. For example, Nick Dearden of Global Justice Now, argued in an article in the Guardian that trade deals such as CETA and TTIP were a means for big business to increase their power over society. He said:

The whole purpose of Ceta is to reduce regulation on business, the idea being that it will make it easier to export. But it will do far more than that. Through the pleasant-sounding “regulatory cooperation”, standards would be reduced across the board on the basis that they are “obstacles to trade”. That could include food safety, workers’ rights and environmental regulation.30

 

4.   Ratification of CETA in European and UK Parliament

4.1   CETA as a “mixed” agreement

The ratification process depends on whether the agreement is a  “mixed” agreement. This type of agreement includes areas where Member States as well as the EU exercise competence. If this is the case, it must be ratified by all Member States as well as the European Union (i.e. the Council, acting by qualified majority and in some cases by unanimity – see Article 218 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), with the consent of the European Parliament in most cases. By contrast, an “EU only” agreement only requires ratification by the European Union (the Council).

The Commission said in July 2016 that CETA was being put forward as a mixed agreement. Press reports indicated, however, that the Commission had been hoping to classify the agreement as EU-only but backed down in the face of opposition from some Member States.31  The trade commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, said that from a strict legal point of view, the Commission thought that CETA was an EU-only deal but acknowledged political problems with this and said that CETA was being put forward as a mixed agreement to allow for speedy signature:

From a strict legal standpoint, the Commission considers this agreement to fall under exclusive EU competence. However, the political situation in the Council is clear, and we understand the need for proposing it as a 'mixed' agreement, in order to allow for a speedy signature32

It is worth noting that the European Commission has asked the European Court of Justice for a ruling on whether the EU-Singapore free trade agreement is a mixed agreement or an EU only agreement. In its proposal for a Council decision on the signature of CETA, the Commission notes that CETA and the Singapore agreement have “essentially the same contents” and states the Commission’s view that the Singapore agreement is EU only. It notes that many Member States disagree with this view. The Commission says that once the Court issues its opinion, “it will be necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions.”33

The need for ratification of CETA by national parliaments is likely to  slow down ratification of the agreement and it has been suggested that it could “even scupper the agreement.”34

 

 

4.2      Ratification in the EU

On 5 July 2016, the Commission proposed to the Council that CETA be signed and concluded (ie ratified).35 The Commission also proposed provisional application of the agreement (see section 4.3 below). CETA was signed on 30 October 2016. After signature, the agreement goes to the European Parliament for approval. The European Parliament’s consent will be needed before CETA can come into force (but see comments on provisional application below).36

 

4.3      Provisional application

As a mixed agreement, CETA will need to be approved by EU Member States in accordance with their own national procedures before it can fully come into effect. It has been suggested that this could mean approval by as many as 38 parliamentary chambers, including regional ones.37

However, trade agreements may be applied provisionally before the ratification process in the members states is complete, provided the European Parliament gives its consent and with the agreement of the Council.38 Assuming these conditions are met, the vast majority of CETA’s provisions will be provisionally applied (98% according to an article in the Financial Times).39 Provisional application is expected to take place in spring 2017.40 The controversial Investment Court System will not be included in provisional application.41 The UK Government supports provisional application.42

The Stop-TTIP campaign has said that most of the agreement could be provisionally  implemented:

the most likely scenario is the one that will see CETA proceeding for ratification in the EU Parliament late this year and then, with the Council’s blessing, more than 90% of CETA will enter into force. The remaining bits of it will require ratification by national parliaments. In other words, this procedure bypasses national parliaments and de facto undermines the Commission’s proposal on shared competences.43

An Early Day Motion opposing provisional application of CETA had been signed by 80 MPs as of October 2016.44  Groups campaigning against CETA are also opposed to its provisional application on the grounds that it is undemocratic.45

 

4.4               Ratification by UK Parliament

Parliament cannot amend the CETA agreement: it can only accept it or object to it. The procedure by which Parliament ratifies treaties is set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (sections 20 to 25).46

Mixed agreements requiring ratification must be laid before Parliament along with an Explanatory Memorandum. Both the agreement and the memorandum are laid before Parliament for 21 sitting days (defined as days when both the Commons and Lords are sitting). The agreement can be ratified if the 21 day period has passed without either House having resolved that the agreement should not be ratified.

If either House passes a resolution objecting to ratification, the Government must then give reasons why it still wants to ratify the agreement. If the Commons objects to ratification, it has another 21 days to consider the Government’s reasons for ratification and can object again. The agreement may only be ratified if this further period of 21 days has passed without the Commons having resolved that the treaty not be ratified.

This process can continue indefinitely giving the House of Commons the power to block ratification. The House of Lords has only one opportunity to object so can only delay ratification briefly. This process was set out in the following PQ answer:

Caroline Lucas:

To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, what plans the Government has for parliamentary scrutiny of the EU-Canada trade agreement; and whether the Government will bring that agreement to the House for a vote.

Anna Soubry:

We expect that the EU–Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) will be a “mixed” agreement, covering areas of both EU and Member State competence. In that case, it will be subject to agreement by each EU Member State, the EU Council and the European Parliament. As part of this process the agreement will be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny before it is ratified by the UK. The complete draft text of the agreement would be laid before Parliament for at least 21 sitting days during which time MPs and Lords may debate the treaty in either or both Houses and vote against the proposed ratification. For the parts of the agreement within UK competence, the proposals for a Council decision on signature and, subsequently, conclusion will be subject to scrutiny in both Houses of the UK Parliament. In  practice EU trade agreements which contain a mixture of EU and Member State competence are agreed by consensus, this means the UK must agree before the treaty can fully come into force.47

 

 

Consideration by European Scrutiny Committee

In addition to the process for ratification of the agreement, the Government has also committed to a debate on CETA on the Floor of the House before provisional application of the agreement.

In September 2016, the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee recommended that there be an early debate on CETA on the Floor of the House for the following three reasons:

  • It raises complex legal and policy issues for the  UK,  both while it is a Member of the EU and after its withdrawal from the EU, which the Government has as yet failed to adequately address (including on issues of competence, provisional application and the implications of Brexit);
  • The trade deal continues to generate significant public interest (for example, various stakeholders across the EU have raised strong opposition to its investment provisions); there is a general need for more transparency in trade negotiations and their conclusion to ensure their democratic legitimacy; and
  • Although there is parliamentary control over ratification of treaties, such a debate would provide the only opportunity for the House of Commons as a whole to scrutinise and have a say on the Government’s position on CETA before it is signed and then 48

 

In October, the Committee granted a conditional scrutiny waiver for signature of the agreement, recognising the time constraints involved in arranging a debate before CETA was signed. This was granted on condition that the debate on the Floor of the House be scheduled urgently to allow consideration of CETA before its provisional application in 2017.49

The Committee held an oral evidence session on CETA on 26 October 2016 at which the Chair, Sir William Cash, said that the Government’s decision to agree to CETA’s provisional application and to its conclusion

 

“constitutes an override of our scrutiny reserve resolution”.50 Appearing before the Committee, Dr Liam Fox, Secretary of State for International Trade, said:

I am sorry that the timescales meant that it was not possible to have a debate before decisions needed to be made on CETA in the Council. This was down to the parliamentary calendar and the timescale set for us. However, I therefore reinforce my commitment to the Committee today to hold such a debate. I am very happy to have that debate on the Floor of the House. Our officials are already working with business managers to identify a date, most likely, we understand, in November, but the  Committee will understand that that is for the business managers.51

 

 

 

5.        Impact of Brexit

The precise date of Brexit is not yet known and neither is the timing of CETA coming into force, or even whether it will be approved. If CETA is provisionally implemented while the UK is still in the EU, then the UK will be subject to all rights and obligations arising from the agreement while it remains a Member State, as explained in the PQ below.

Ms Tasmina Ahmed-Sheikh: [41487]

To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, what assessment he has made of the implications of the EU referendum result for his plans to implement the EU Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.

Anna Soubry:

[Holding answer 4 July 2016]: While the UK is still a member of the EU, all rights and obligations will apply. We continue to support the EU’s trade agenda and the UK will participate constructively in EU decision making on trade issues including proceeding with implementation of the agreed EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).52

It is much less certain whether the UK will still be in the EU by the time CETA has been ratified by all Member States, as this may take a number of years. While the position is not entirely clear, it is doubtful whether CETA would continue to apply to the UK once it had left the EU. The European Scrutiny Committee report said:

The Government’s analysis is that on leaving the EU, the UK will lose access to the trade preferences set out in CETA “unless arrangements to do are put in place as part of [its] negotiations with the EU”. The Minister states that his Department is “examining options for the UK to enjoy continued access to its current trade preferences to provide continuity for UK businesses” and will update the Committee in due course as it develops its analysis.53

The Treasury Committee considered whether the UK would still be covered by EU trade agreements with other countries after Brexit. It said:

Were the UK to leave the EU, it is very uncertain whether it would be able to continue to participate in these agreements. The extent to which the UK would have to enter into negotiations to ensure its continued participation would probably depend on the attitude of the contracting parties, about which little is known.54

As noted in section 3.1 above, concerns have been raised that the UK could be tied into CETA’s investment provisions for up to 20 years if Brexit has not happened by the time CETA is fully ratified.55

 

6.                 Links to further information

Text of CETA: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-  agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-  tdm.aspx?lang=eng

European Commission

Commission CETA website

CETA – Summary of the final negotiating results, February 2016

 

House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee

Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Oral evidence on Parliamentary scrutiny of EU  Trade Deal: EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 26 October 2016

House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Thirteenth Report of  Session 2016-17, 18 October 2016, HC 71-xi pp3-4 and 8-19

 

Canadian Government

Canada – European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade  Agreement (contains overview of agreement and chapter-by-chapter summaries)

 

European Parliament Research Service briefings

Is CETA a mixed agreement?, 1 July 2016

Agriculture in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade  Agreement (CETA), July 2016

EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, January 2016

Negotiations on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade  Agreement (CETA) concluded, October 2014

Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, October 2016

A guide to EU procedures for the conclusion of international trade  agreements, October 2016

Criticisms of CETA

Global Justice Now, CETA  Stop TTIP

Corporate Europe Observatory (and others), The zombie ISDS, by Pia Eberhardt, March 2016

 

_____________________________________

1) European Commission Press Release, European Commission proposes signature and  conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal, 5 July 2016

2) European Commission Press Release, European Commission proposes signature and  conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal, 5 July 2016

3) The Joint Interpretative Instrument

4) “Signature signals the intention to conclude, it does not conclude the agreement as such”, European Parliament Research Service Briefing, A guide to EU procedures for  the conclusion of international trade agreements, October 2016, p6

5) European Parliament Research Service, Is CETA a mixed agreement? 1 July 2016

6) PQ 20279 7 January 2016. It is not clear what “the long run” refers to, but £1.3 billion is around 0.07% of 2015 GDP or around £20 per head.

7) European Commission, CETA

8) See Global Justice Now, CETA: TTIP’s little brother, September 2015

9) Cecilia Malmström CETA Europe’s Next Step, Speech at European Parliament, 9 December 2015

10) There is more information on TTIP in a Library note.

11) Pia Eberhardt, The zombie ISDS, March 2016, p17

12) “German activists plan legal action in bid to halt trade deal”, Financial Times, 30 May 2016

13) For more detail on the provisions relating to agriculture, see European Parliament Research Service, Agriculture in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade  Agreement (CETA), July 2016

14)  European Commission website, CETA

15)  European Commission website, CETA

16)  European Commission website, CETA

17) CETA Annex 20-A

18) European Commission, Investment provisions in the EU-Canada free trade  agreement (CETA), February 2016

19)Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Joint statement  by Cecilia Malmström and Chrystia Freeland, 29 February 2016. The Commission has published a factsheet on ISDS and CETA.

20) Friends of the Earth Europe, Dangerous CETA deal must be rejected, 29 February 2016

21) Pia Eberhardt, The zombie ISDS, March 2016, p29

22) Pia Eberhardt, The zombie ISDS, March 2016, p5

23) Stop TTIP, Legal Statement on Investment Protection in TTIP and CETA, 17 October 2016

24) Global Justice Now, EU accused of trying to push through ‘toxic’ trade deal ahead of  Brexit, 4 July 2016

25) CETA text

26)  CETA negotiating mandate, 2009

27)   As defined by Article I-3 of GATS. For more on this, see  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm

28) European Parliament, Negotiations on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and  Trade Agreement (CETA) concluded, October 2014

29) Unison, TTIP, CETA and TISA – what you need to know about EU trade agreements, March 2015, p3

30) Nick Dearden, Think TTIP is a threat to democracy? There’s another trade deal that’s   already signed, Guardian, 30 May 2016

31)  “Juncker to give way on EU-Canada trade plan”, Financial Times, 4 July 2016

32) European Commission Press Release, European Commission proposes signature and  conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal, 5 July 2016

33)  European Commission, COM(2106) 444 final, 5 July 2016, p2

34) Parliament plot, The Economist [Charlemagne column] 23 July 2016

35) European Commission Press Release, European Commission proposes signature and  conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal, 5 July 2016

36) See EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Briefing by European Parliamentary Research Service, January 2016, p2 and European Commission (DG Trade), Trade negotiations step by step, September 2013, pp6-7

37) “National ratification issue could derail EU-Canada trade deal”, Financial Times, 3 July 2016

38) European Commission, CETA – a trade deal that sets a new standard for global  trade – fact sheet, 29 October 2016

39) EU and Canada sign deal amid fears about future of trade policy, Financial Times, 30 October 2016

40) House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session  2016-17, 18 October 2016, HC 71-xi para 1.2

41) European Commission press release, EU-Canada summit: newly signed trade  agreement sets high standard for global trade, 30 October 2016

42) European Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence on Parliamentary scrutiny of EU Trade  Deal: EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 26 October 2016, HC792,  Q1

43)  Stop-TTIP, The Commission of Illusionists, blog post, 29 July 2016. The UK Government’s Explanatory Memorandum on the EU-Republic of Korea Trade Agreement said that the EU and Korea would provisionally apply all the commitments over which they hold competence “which is the vast majority”.

44) EDM 165

45 See, for example, Stop-TTIP, The Commission of Illusionists, blog post, 29 July 2016 and Global Justice Now, EU ambassador to Canada says EU-Canada free trade deal  may become UK law without UK parliamentary debate, 23 January 2016

46) This section is based on, and there is more information in, Commons Library Briefing  Paper 7192, EU External Agreements: EU and UK procedures, 28 March 2016

47) PQ 37197 26 May 2016

48) House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2016-  17, HC 71-viii, 13 September 2016, p3

49) House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session  2016-17, 18 October 2016, HC 71-xi p4

50) European Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence on Parliamentary scrutiny of EU Trade  Deal: EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 26 October 2016, HC792,  Q1

51) European Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence on Parliamentary scrutiny of EU Trade  Deal: EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 26 October 2016, HC792,  Q1

52) PQ 41487 6 July 2016

53) House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session  2016-17, 18 October 2016, HC 71-xi para 1.11

54) Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits of the UK’s EU  membership, HC 122, 27 May 2016, para 226

55) Global Justice Now, EU accused of trying to push through ‘toxic’ trade deal ahead of  Brexit, 4 July 2016

 

 

About the Library

The House of Commons Library research service provides MPs and their staff with the impartial briefing and evidence base they need to do their work in scrutinising Government, proposing legislation, and supporting constituents.

As well as providing MPs with a confidential service we publish open briefing papers, which are available on the Parliament website.

Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in these publically available research briefings is correct at the time of publication. Readers should be aware however that briefings are not necessarily updated or otherwise amended to reflect subsequent changes.

If you have any comments on our briefings please email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing only with Members and their staff.

If you have any general questions about the work of the House of Commons you can email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Disclaimer

This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties. It is a general briefing only and should not be relied on as a substitute for specific advice. The House of Commons or the author(s) shall not be liable for any errors or omissions, or for any loss or damage of any kind arising from its use, and may remove, vary or amend any information at any time without prior notice.

The House of Commons accepts no responsibility for any references or links to, or the content of, information maintained by third parties. This information is provided subject to the conditions of the Open Parliament Licence.

Read more...

EU-NATO joint declaration

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

We believe that the time has come to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership.
In consultation with the EU Member States and the NATO Allies, working with, and for the benefit of all, this partnership will take place in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members.
Today, the Euro-Atlantic community is facing unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and East. Our citizens demand that we use all ways and means available to address these challenges so as to enhance their security.
All Allies and Member States, as well as the EU and NATO per se, are already making significant contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. The substantial cooperation between NATO and the EU, unique and essential partners, established more than 15 years ago, also contributes to this end.
In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step-up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond.
We are convinced that enhancing our neighbours' and partners' stability in accordance with our values, as enshrined in the UN Charter, contributes to our security and to sustainable peace and prosperity. So that our neighbours and partners are better able to address the numerous challenges they currently face, we will continue to support their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, as well as their reform efforts.
In fulfilling the objectives above, we believe there is an urgent need to:
• Boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response. The development of coordinated procedures through our respective playbooks will substantially contribute to implementing our efforts.
• Broaden and adapt our operational cooperation including at sea, and on migration, through increased sharing of maritime situational awareness as well as better coordination and mutual reinforcement of our activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.
• Expand our coordination on cyber security and defence including in the context of our missions and operations, exercises and on education and training.
• Develop coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects.
• Facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic.
• Step up our coordination on exercises, including on hybrid, by developing as the first step parallel and coordinated exercises for 2017 and 2018.
• Build the defence and security capacity and foster the resilience of our partners in the East and South in a complementary way through specific projects in a variety of areas for individual recipient countries, including by strengthening maritime capacity.

Cooperation in these areas is a strategic priority. Speedy implementation is essential. The European External Action Service and the NATO International Staff, together with Commission services as appropriate, will develop concrete options for implementation, including appropriate staff coordination mechanisms, to be presented to us and our respective Councils by December 2016. On the EU side, the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission will steer and coordinate this endeavour.
We will review progress on a regular basis.
We call on both organisations to invest the necessary political capital and resources to make this reinforced partnership a success.

Donald Tusk
President of the European Council

Jean-Claude Juncker
President of the European Commission

Jens Stoltenberg
Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization


Signed at Warsaw on 8 July 2016 in triplicate.

Read more...

Joint Declaration by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the French Republic and the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic

Joint Declaration by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the French Republic and the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic

On 23 June 2016, the majority of the British people have expressed their wish to leave the European Union. Germany, France and Italy respect this decision. We regret that the United Kingdom will no longer be our partner within the European Union.

We are fully confident that the European Union is strong enough to give the right answers today. There is no time to waste.

Today we convey our strong commitment to European unity. It is our firm conviction that the European Union is essential to make our countries stronger by acting together, with our common Institutions, in order to ensure economic and social progress for our people and to assert Europe’s role in the world.

For almost 60 years, the EU constitutes a unique community of rights, freedoms, law and common values. The EU enables us to safeguard our European social model which combines economic success with social protection. The EU enables us to preserve our cultural diversity. The single Market, our common policies and the Euro are unique in the world. These achievements are the foundation of our prosperity. Jointly, we campaign to promote our interests within an agenda for free and fair trade in the world. Jointly, we progress in our energy policy and jointly we contribute to global climate protection. Jointly, we contribute to stability and development in the world and promote freedom.

It is our equally firm conviction that the European Union can be brought forward again only if it continues to be built upon the support of its citizens.

Therefore, the European Union must address the concerns expressed by its people by clarifying its objectives and its functioning. It should be stronger on essential priorities, where the Europeans must join forces and be less present when the Member States are better placed to act. It remains under the democratic control of its citizens and should be better intelligible. It must act faster, in particular in delivering programs and projects which provide direct benefits to the citizens.

In a changing world, the European Union should preserve its essential acquis and focus on the challenges the Europeans face today like worldwide migration and new threats, in particular international terrorism that no single Member State can effectively overcome alone. It must also reinforce the capacity of the Europeans to respond to growing international competition while strengthening the European social market economy.

Read more...

English will not be an official EU language after Brexit, says senior MEP

English will not be an official EU language after Brexit, says senior MEP

No other EU country has English as their official language and so it could lose its status.

By HORTENSE GOULARD | 6/27/2016 | www.politico.eu

Danuta Hübner, the head of the European Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO), warned Monday that English will not be one of the European Union’s official languages after Britain leaves the EU.

English is one of the EU’s 24 official languages because the U.K. identified it as its own official language, Hübner said. But as soon as Britain completes the process to leave the EU, English could lose its status.

 “We have a regulation … where every EU country has the right to notify one official language,” Hübner said. “The Irish have notified Gaelic, and the Maltese have notified Maltese, so you have only the U.K. notifying English.”

“If we don’t have the U.K., we don’t have English,” Hübner said.

Read more...

Brexit : Saving private Europe

Dear Britons, if you stay, you will ruin our lives like never before. Here is why.

My English friends, as it’s only you who are tempted by a 'Brexit, don’t be won over by the arguments of the Remain campaigners, and vote Leave on 23 June!

I’ll be honest, it’s not really in your interest to leave the EU. It’s obvious that Brexit campaigners are lying to you in making you believe that, alone, you’ll get by better in a world that’s already dominated by the US, Asia, and soon, Africa, while the Europe that you vilify so much is largely in your hands ideologically, to the point where it governs 28 nations in your own language.

But I digress. Here, I’m defending the point of view of the EU, and it’s in its interest that you leave. If you stay, you will ruin our lives like never before: David Cameron will be the only European leader capable of winning a referendum on Europe and will therefore gain a central role in the EU game. He and his successors will then negotiate concession upon concession in order to completely bury the federal dream of the fathers of Europe and achieve the transformation of the Old Continent into a free-market zone with less and less backbone. Any hope of a European resurgence will be also be buried, definitively. The EU is already dying, despite the wish of European governments to go further. The national scene is now dominated everywhere by sovereigntists who have hijacked the debate and sometimes power itself, such as in Eastern Europe. European values have been blown to smithereens, as evident in the surrender of the right to asylum. And ruling parties think that an election can only result in victory for a eurosceptic wing (much as the Austrian presidential election proved the opposite…).

Read more...

Maori language 'in danger of dying out'

Maori language 'in danger of dying out'

The Maori language is in danger of dying out because of neglect by successive New Zealand governments, a new report has claimed.

By Paul Chapman in Wellington | The Telegraph | 20 Oct 2010

Justice Joe Williams, chairing an inquiry by the Waitangi Tribunal – the statutory body that investigates traditional grievances – says the language is in "crisis" and only urgent action will halt its decline.

As older speakers of Maori die out they are not being replaced by enough younger people and the language now needs "life support", the report says.
Less than a quarter of New Zealand's 530,000 Maori say they are fluent enough to hold a conversation in Te Reo Maori (the Maori language), and the number is declining every year.
At the last census in 2006 there were 8,000 fewer Maori speakers than government projections had forecast.
The study says that since 1993 the proportion of Maori children in Maori-language schools has fallen from half to a quarter.

Read more...

Ghana to eliminate English as medium of instruction in schools

Ghana is following suit with several other African nations that are doing away with the foreign languages imposed on them by imperialistic powers centuries ago and are reverting to their native tongues. Ghana recently announced its new plan to eliminate English as the primary language of instruction in its schools.
Professor Jane Naana Opoku Agyemang, the country’s minister of education, said the problem Ghana’s educated working class faces is mostly because of their inability to have the nation adapt to the language used in teaching them in schools, reports say.
Speaking at the Shared Prosperity on Forum recently, Agyemang said she was adamant about pushing through the language policy at the highest level so that students can be taught in their native tongues, which would also provide therapeutic, healing results.
She expressed confidence that replacing English as the primary language of instruction would “change this country.”
As the minister announced the news, loud cheers came from the audience, reports said. Although the change in language policy has been discussed for quite some time, it has not been aggressively pursued until now, causing many to become optimistic that their colonizers’ shackles are slowly, yet surely, being shaken off.
Agyemang relayed the example of how a country such as Korea has accelerated its development because of its children being taught in their own indigenous language.
Earlier last year, Gambia and Tanzania announced their plans to terminate their European colonizers’ foreign languages as the medium of instruction in their school systems.

 3/10/2016, Amsterdam News

Read more...

Common language of the human species: Radicals meet Chief UN Office Flumiani.

Relating to the Radical Party and Era Onlus and campaign for the common language of the human species, Giorgio Pagano and Monia Chimienti met, on December 16 at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Embassy Counsellor Catherine Flumiani, Chief UN Office of the General Division of Political Affairs to the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

During the meeting, which was also attended by Secretary of Legation of 2nd Office Pierro, was recalled, taking advantage of the discussion on the Post 2015objectives of the Organization, the Radical initiative to raise awareness of the United Nations about the Campaign of the common language of the human species both in the pursuit of prosperity for all, peace, nonviolence, and in respect of linguistic and cultural biodiversity. It 'was important to remember the positive reception of the Italian permanent Embassy at the United Nations, as well as the meeting with the Papal Nuncio and the permanent Ambassadors of Benin, Ireland, Haiti and Panama.

The Radical delegation illustrated the increasingly pressing need to have a language for humanity in the perspective of greater continental union that is likely to have, however, nationalistic results for the effect oligopolistic which already is jeopardizing the internal democracy with the impositions to 28 member countries of the English, French and German. Just as European studies made by Selten, Grin and Lukacs indicating the billionaires economic effects of language discrimination in Europe, could be proposed to the United Nations to carry out analogues in a global approach.

While purely in terms of human rights and the pursuit of Peace would be the one already developed by the League of Nations in the '20s and to be proposed today by virtue of the new empires, those of the Mind, which derive from linguistic domination far greater gains not by past colonial conquests through the occupation of territories and enslavement of peoples.

Councillor Flumiani showed that, however, Italy is a country that talks to everyone and this certainly facilitates initiatives that undertakes, about this one is necessary to inform the ministerial chain, in order to have an operational decision on the merits which, however, it will also rely on the creation of a "hard core" of governments and NGOs in the United Nations, that will support it actively.

Read more...
Subscribe to this RSS feed

"Esperanto" Radikala Asocio


Associazione Radicale Esperanto
Esperanto Radical Association

Senza scopo di lucro dal  25 aprile 1987
O.N.L.U.S. dal 1998
Codice fiscale 97104360587
Ente Servizio Civile Nazionale NZ02506
Conto corrente postale 60397007
Conto bancario presso Poste italiane IBAN:
IT07N0760103200000060397007
Associazione costituente del Partito Radicale
nonviolento, transnazionale e transpartito